大型咨詢及會(huì)計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)正冒險(xiǎn)向戰(zhàn)略服務(wù)推進(jìn)
Bigconsulting and accounting firms are making a risky move into strategy work
大型咨詢及會(huì)計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)正冒險(xiǎn)向戰(zhàn)略服務(wù)推進(jìn)
“OPERATIONS consultants sit at the front of the classroom,” says a partner at a strategy consultancy. “Strategyconsultants stay in the back, not paying attention, throwing paper airplanes.But they still get the girls and get rich.” Like somany caricatures, this one is cruel but contains a grain of truth. Operationsconsultants—the fine-detail guys who tinker withbusinesses’ internal processes to make them run better—generally do not enjoy the same glamour or financial rewards asstrategy specialists, whose job is to advise firms on make-or-break deals,adopting new business models and other big stuff.
“運(yùn)營(yíng)咨詢顧問(wèn)坐在教室的前排，”一名戰(zhàn)略咨詢公司合伙人說(shuō)道?！皯?zhàn)略咨詢顧問(wèn)則呆在后面，扔著紙飛機(jī)，并不認(rèn)真。但他們?nèi)匀蛔鴵砼⑴c金錢(qián)?！本透芏嘀S刺漫畫(huà)一樣，這樣的場(chǎng)景很殘酷，但卻包含著一絲真理。運(yùn)營(yíng)咨詢顧問(wèn)是注重細(xì)節(jié)的角色，負(fù)責(zé)修改企業(yè)的內(nèi)部流程，讓企業(yè)運(yùn)行得更好。這種角色的魅力或獎(jiǎng)金通常不如戰(zhàn)略咨詢顧問(wèn)。戰(zhàn)略咨詢顧問(wèn)負(fù)責(zé)就公司的決策、商業(yè)模式以及其他重大事項(xiàng)提出建議。
Although in practice their work overlaps, thetwo have until now remained distinct businesses. Strategy firms like McKinsey,Bain and the Boston Consulting Group hire from the top universities, are packedwith highly paid partners and whisper their counsel in CEOs’ears. In contrast, operations specialists such as IBM, Accenture and the BigFour accounting firms (Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PwC) employ armies of lower-paidgrunts; and tend to answer to the client firm’s financeor tech chiefs.
雖然在實(shí)際工作中兩者的分工有所重疊，但區(qū)別仍十分明顯。戰(zhàn)略咨詢公司，比如麥肯錫、貝恩和波士頓咨詢集團(tuán)，從頂尖大學(xué)招聘員工，擁有收入頗豐的合伙人們,并悄聲把建議告訴給CEO們。然而，那些運(yùn)營(yíng)顧問(wèn)，比如IBM、埃森哲以及四大會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所（德勤、安永、畢馬威和普華永道），則雇傭了大批收入較低的低等兵，向客戶公司的財(cái)務(wù)或技術(shù)主管交付工作成果。
This year, however, that line has begun to blur.In January Deloitte became the largest of the Big Four by scooping up theassets of Monitor, a strategy firm that had gone bust. And on October 30th itsclosest rival, PwC, said it would buy another strategy firm, Booz &Company, for a reported $1 billion. If Booz’spartners approve the deal, it will vault PwC back into first place.
然而，自2013年開(kāi)始,上述界限變得模糊起來(lái)。2013年1月，德勤收購(gòu)了破產(chǎn)的戰(zhàn)略咨詢公司摩利特，并成為了四大中最大的一家。2013年10月30日，德勤的最大競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手普華永道表示，其將以10億美元的對(duì)價(jià)收購(gòu)另外一家戰(zhàn)略公司——博斯。假如博斯的合伙人批準(zhǔn)該項(xiàng)收購(gòu)，那么普華永道將重回四大第一位。
The accountancies’ pushinto strategy has been a decade in the making. During the late-1990s technologybubble they beefed up their IT-consulting arms. But in 2001 Enron, anenergy-trading firm, went bust and took its auditor, Arthur Andersen, down withit. In response, America’s Congress passed theSarbanes-Oxley corporate-governance reform, which banned firms from doingsystems consulting for companies they audited. As a consolation prize, the BigFour made a fortune helping clients comply with the new law. Their advisorybusinesses, full of potential for conflicts of interest with their auditingside, by now seemed dispensable. All but Deloitte had sold off those divisionsby 2003.
十年以來(lái)，會(huì)計(jì)所們一直在向戰(zhàn)略咨詢業(yè)務(wù)推進(jìn)。1990年代晚期，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫使會(huì)計(jì)所中的IT咨詢部門(mén)強(qiáng)大起來(lái)。但是，能源貿(mào)易公司安然在2001年破產(chǎn)， 也牽連到了其審計(jì)師安達(dá)信。結(jié)果，美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)通過(guò)了《薩班斯－奧克斯利》公司治理改革法案，禁止審計(jì)公司向其審計(jì)客戶公司提供系統(tǒng)咨詢服務(wù)。作為對(duì)審計(jì)師的安慰補(bǔ)償，四大會(huì)計(jì)所通過(guò)為其客戶提供新法律的合規(guī)業(yè)務(wù)大賺了一筆。與審計(jì)業(yè)務(wù)充滿潛在利益沖突的咨詢業(yè)務(wù)因而變得可有可無(wú)。截至2003年，除德勤之外的四大均賣(mài)掉了自己的咨詢部門(mén)。
Just as the workload from Sarbanes-Oxley began to dwindle, the 2008-09financial crisis hit, causing consulting revenues to dip (see chart). But oncethe economy recovered, the climate for the Big Four started to resemble the1990s. They began to rush back into consultancy, encouraged by its high marginsand double-digit annual growth rates at a time when revenue growth fromauditing and tax work had slowed. In particular, Deloitte and PwC began gobblingup operations consultancies as they sparred for the top spot.
由于《薩班斯－奧克斯利》法案合規(guī)業(yè)務(wù)量開(kāi)始逐步減少，加之2008至2009年金融危機(jī)的爆發(fā)，導(dǎo)致咨詢業(yè)務(wù)收入降至了最低點(diǎn)（見(jiàn)圖表）。但是，經(jīng)濟(jì)一旦恢復(fù)，四大所又回復(fù)到1990年代時(shí)的樣子：他們受到更高利潤(rùn)、兩位數(shù)增長(zhǎng)率的驅(qū)使，蜂擁向咨詢業(yè)務(wù)。同時(shí)，審計(jì)和稅務(wù)業(yè)務(wù)的收入增幅開(kāi)始下降。特別是德勤和普華永道，他們拼命擴(kuò)張自己的運(yùn)營(yíng)咨詢業(yè)務(wù)，以爭(zhēng)奪業(yè)內(nèi)第一的位置。
For years the strategy firms remained beyond theBig Four’s grasp.During the 2000s they had mostly prospered on their own, and their partnersshuddered at the thought of being subsumed into giant bureaucracies. After thefinancial crisis, however, midsized strategy consultants hit hard times.Cost-conscious companies with globalising businesses wanted either to hireboutiques with deep knowledge of their industries, or to benefit from the scaleof generalist firms with offices everywhere. Too big for some clients and toosmall for others, Monitor went under, and Booz—aspin-off from Booz Allen Hamilton, which now focuses on operations work forgovernments—went on the block.
多年以前，戰(zhàn)略咨詢業(yè)務(wù)曾超出四大的勝任能力。2000年時(shí)，這些戰(zhàn)略咨詢機(jī)構(gòu)僅憑自身的業(yè)務(wù)，就能夠繁榮興旺。但是，他們?nèi)院ε聲?huì)被別的巨型機(jī)構(gòu)吞并。金融危機(jī)之后，中型戰(zhàn)略咨詢公司遭遇了艱難時(shí)期。成本意識(shí)較強(qiáng)且有國(guó)際業(yè)務(wù)的客戶希望雇傭擁有較深行業(yè)知識(shí)的精品咨詢機(jī)構(gòu)或者規(guī)模遍布全球的大型專業(yè)機(jī)構(gòu)。諸如摩利特、博斯這樣的咨詢公司對(duì)一些客戶來(lái)說(shuō)太大，對(duì)一些客戶來(lái)說(shuō)又太小了。正因如此，摩利特倒閉，而博斯被收購(gòu)了。
Both Booz and PwC say that the two sides ofconsulting are converging, and that more clients want a one-stop shop that canboth devise a strategy and execute it. Deloitte and Monitor claim theirintegration is already bearing fruit. “There’s been a very healthytwo-way cross-selling opportunity,” says Mike Canningof Deloitte.
博斯和普華永道表示，兩邊的咨詢業(yè)務(wù)正在重合。越來(lái)越多的客戶希望一站式服務(wù)，既包括戰(zhàn)略建議又包括執(zhí)行建議。德勤和摩利特聲稱，他們的整合已經(jīng)開(kāi)花結(jié)果，“現(xiàn)時(shí)已經(jīng)有不少雙向交叉的銷售機(jī)會(huì)，”德勤的麥克?坎寧表示。
Nonetheless, Booz’s leadership still faces a hard sellto get the deal passed. In 2010 the company’s partnersvoted down a proposed merger with AT Kearney, another midsized strategy firm.This marriage involves far more risks. A significant number of Booz’s clients would immediately be in doubt because PwC audits them—strategy consulting for audit clients is banned in many countries,and even where it is legal it is frowned upon (not least in America). Since theBig Four are structured as associations of national partnerships, Booz’s staff would probably end up being divided by country, hinderingthe global co-operation that many big clients seek.
然而，博斯的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層仍面臨合并交易的難產(chǎn)。2010年，公司合伙人曾就與另一家咨詢公司AT科尼爾的合并議案投了反對(duì)票?，F(xiàn)在普華永道與博斯兩家公司的合并會(huì)有更大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。大量博斯的客戶會(huì)開(kāi)始懷疑，由于普華永道是他們的審計(jì)師――對(duì)審計(jì)客戶提供戰(zhàn)略咨詢服務(wù)在很多國(guó)家是被禁止的，這種做法哪怕在被允許的國(guó)家里也有所欠妥（不止是在美國(guó)）。四大會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所在各個(gè)國(guó)家互相獨(dú)立，博斯的員工可能將按照國(guó)家被拆分到不同的本地機(jī)構(gòu),從而阻礙許多大型客戶所探尋的全球合作。
Most important, each of Booz’s 300 partners would have to trademeaningful sway over the direction of a highly profitable firm for a minusculestake in a diversified, lower-margin empire. If the sale is approved, the testof its success will come in a few years, after Booz’spartners receive their full payout and can head off. An exodus would leave PwCempty-handed.
對(duì)博斯300名合伙人來(lái)說(shuō)最重要的是，他們將不得不把在一間高利潤(rùn)機(jī)構(gòu)中舉足輕重的分量轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)樵谝粋€(gè)多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)、低利潤(rùn)的大帝國(guó)里的小份股權(quán)。假如這筆收購(gòu)能夠得到批準(zhǔn)，這次合并成功與否將在博斯合伙人的股份出資全部收回之后的未來(lái)幾年得到驗(yàn)證。如果業(yè)務(wù)大量流失,那將使普華永道一無(wú)所獲。
The Big Four are also running a risk far greaterthan the cost of their purchases. A decade ago they placated regulators byretreating from advisory work. High-profile deals like the Booz-PwC tie-up putthe conflict of interest between auditing and consulting back in the spotlight:after it was announced, Arthur Levitt, a former head of America’s Securities and ExchangeCommission, warned that the firms were “slipping back” towards old, bad habits. Any gains from pushing into strategy workmight end up being outweighed by the cost of another regulatory crackdown.
除了收購(gòu)所花的成本之外,四大還面臨著更大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。十年前，他們撤出了咨詢業(yè)務(wù)，安撫了監(jiān)管者。像博斯與普華永道這樣的高規(guī)格合并交易使得審計(jì)和咨詢業(yè)務(wù)之間的利益沖突又成了監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)及公眾關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。該收購(gòu)一經(jīng)宣布，美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)前任負(fù)責(zé)任阿瑟?萊維特就發(fā)出警告,稱這些公司正在“倒退”回過(guò)去的不良習(xí)慣。在戰(zhàn)略業(yè)務(wù)中獲得的收益最終可能甚至不如為另一輪監(jiān)管打擊所付出的代價(jià)來(lái)得大。
